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A Contribution to the Debate 
on Criticism in the Political Sciences
Abstract: The author’s aim is to analyse the problem of criticism in the context 
of political sciences, in particular in the context of political philosophy. The issue 
is considered in the light of two basic epistemological standpoints: contextualism 
and presentism. These two approaches are often regarded as mutually exclusive; how-
ever, the author presents arguments for their possible complementarity and demon-
strates that their concurrence is the necessary point of departure for critical attitudes 
in political philosophy..
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An essential factor that should accompany also political philosophiz-
ing is historical awareness of the discipline itself. Philosophical reflec-
tion on politics can already be found in pre-Socratic reflection. Moreo-
ver, the foundations of the rationalization of reflection on the political 
sphere can be found long before the birth of philosophy, in various myths 
of the ancient world (we can cite as an example the indications for under-
standing a good ruler and good kingship in the Sumero-Akkadian Epic 
of Gilgamesh). To be brief, the philosophy of politics should be aware 
of the history of his research discipline, which, on the one hand, should 
guard him against prying open doors that are already open, and on 





vidual propositions that have been formulated in the history of reflection 
on the phenomenon of politics. 
The question arises whether the philosopher of politics must be 
a historian of political philosophy. Is his intellectual activity exhausted 
in attempts at reconstructing and understanding the conceptions, 
hypotheses, systems, and propositions that appeared throughout his-
tory?
A wonderful text discussing this problem is Jerzy Szacki’s “Dylematy 
historiografii idei.”1 I will treat his findings as the point of departure 
for my own analyses.
In the beginning, let me cite a lengthier passage from Szacki’s article 
that briefly describes the essence of the problem. He asserts that 
in the historiography of ideas two completely different approaches to the past, 
which are incompatible, permanently coexist: one time we try to grasp the past 
as such, another time we almost forget, that it is the past. The historian of philoso-
phy is a historian, of course, but he cannot also not be a philosopher, because if he 
was not a philosopher, he would not even be able to delimit the sphere of his research, 
not to mention the interpretation of its results. He cannot remain a philosopher, 
though, because a philosopher is interested in problems, not in where those problems 
came from […]. This internal contradiction of the historian of ideas’ condition finds 
its external expression in the discussion renewed every so often between the advo-
cates of historism (or, to use a broader term: contextualism) and presentism.2 
It is significant that in the conclusion of his article he emphasizes 
that consistently upholding either position in the debate is impossi-
ble. Thus, he recognizes that the debate between these positions is key 
for the entire discipline.3 It is difficult not to agree with the author 
on this point, for both standpoints delimit the most essential and most 
general boundaries of the methodology of the history of ideas. I admit 
that I also agree with his conclusion that both consistent contextual-
1 J. Szacki, “Dylematy historiografii idei,” in: Dylematy historiografii idei oraz inne szkice 
i studia (Warszawa: PWN, 1991), p. 11–19.
2 J. Szacki, “Dylematy historiografii idei,” p. 15. 
3 J. Szacki, “Dylematy historiografii idei,” p. 18.
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ism and consistent presentism seem impossible to uphold. But a very 
great difficulty arises here. If upholding either side is impossible, 
what approach should be taken? The simplest answer is: a middle way 
between both extremes. But what does that mean, in essence—a middle 
way between contextualism and presentism?
Again, the issue may seem relatively simple at first. As Dariusz 
Kubok writes in regard to philosophy: “it must be strongly empha-
sized that philosophy (philosophizing) is by nature contextual, while 
its object is not.”4 Again, it is impossible not to agree with this state-
ment. However, it seems that, while within the boundaries of ontology, 
epistemology, and logic the object of philosophy, regardless of context, 
is essentially the same, the matter becomes complicated when we talk 
about the object of political philosophy. A great danger inherent in politi-
cal philosophy is the temptation, visible even in the works of authors 
considered “the classics” of the discipline, to present their approaches 
to contemporary problems through their analyses, but not in the form 
of critical analyses of the problem and indications of the possible impli-
cations of various hypotheses and premises, but in a way which clearly 
reveals the political, ethical, and axiological preferences of the author. 
In such cases, the history of political ideas plays the role of a treasury 
of arguments to back up one’s own views. Such a vividly presentist 
approach has little to do with earnest investigation—and such applica-
tions of presentism in the history of political ideas bring us dangerously 
close to ideology (though I do not assert that presentism must necessar-
ily fall into the trap of ideologization). Defense against this sort of “mis-
take” (manipulation?) seems relatively simple: as Józef Maria Bocheński 
stated in one of his works, in wanting to understand someone’s views 
and conceptions, we should leave aside our own and attempt to “embrace” 
those that are the object of study at the given moment. In regard to polit-
ical philosophy, however, that “leaving aside” or “embracing” requires 
4 D. Kubok, Problem apeiron i peras w filozofii przedsokratejskiej (Katowice: Wydawnictwo 
Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 1998), p. 9.
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special training. Let us put forth the thesis that retaining a critical 
distance towards the object of political philosophy is especially difficult: 
more difficult, in my opinion, than in the case of ontology, epistemology, 
or logic. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the necessary condition for a proper 
methodology in political philosophy is precisely the development of this 
distance towards the issues under study. The surest road leading 
to this is most likely the initial acceptance of a historical, contextual 
standpoint. Why? If we begin from a presentist standpoint, then sup-
plementing it with contextualism (i.e.: introducing contextual correc-
tions), the latter may not suffice. In such a situation, we will be seeking 
either justification for the presentist standpoint, or (at least) prem-
ises for that justification. Such a justification will inevitably be based 
on analogies and similarities which, bearing in mind the presentist 
point of departure, will be sought out and interpreted from the presen-
tist perspective. In consequence, it is very probable that a contextualist 
correction will only be pretence. In reality, the point is not to correct 
presentistically formulated theses, but on the contrary, let us accout 
for—paradoxically—a correction of the context! It is the context, cor-
rected from the perspective of presentist assumptions, that is to serve 
to strengthen the point of departure. In this way, a circulus vitiosus 
arises: I refer to history (in our case—to the history of political ideas) 
to strengthen my own position, without putting in any effort to under-
stand this history, but rather only taking out of the context that which 
fits my starting position. In the end, what counts is only the presentist 
position, and contextualism is, in this case, no more than an instrument 
serving to strengthen the position adopted in the first place. 
To a large degree, the choice to make contextualism the point 
of departure (though, of course, there can be no certainty) guards one 
against this vicious circle. For, in contextualism, the point is to extract 
and understand a historically formulated message in the best way pos-
sible. Therefore, above all, it is necessary to properly distinguish ideas, 
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their meanings, and translational possibilities. Next, it is essential 
for political philosophy to place these ideas on the historico-politico-
legal background of the age. Of course, this attempt must be accom-
panied by the awareness that each researcher is conditioned by his 
own context—cultural, linguistic, etc. Thus, we cannot approach this 
attempt and its results uncritically, thinking that we have truly been 
able to fully grasp the meaning of the message. Most often, the results 
of contextual efforts are several equally-valid interpretations, which 
are further subject to research and evaluation. The argument of oppo-
nents of contextualism, that contextualism is senseless due to the fact 
that we will probably never achieve a full understanding anyway 
and every investigation is to a greater or lesser degree “contaminated” 
by presentism, seems to be a groundless exaggeration. An authentic 
effort at grasping the primary, original sense of a statement, accompa-
nied by the awareness of one’s own cognitive conditions and criticism 
towards one’s findings significantly differs from the “consistent present-
ism” which by definition leaves the context aside and arbitrarily sets 
up the entire problem (to be more precise—in a way relativized to its 
own point of departure). Let us add one more essential remark here. 
Namely, while I accept and use the concept of “contextualism” instead 
of “historism” after Szacki, I feel that it is better to speak of “non-con-
textualism” instead of “presentism.” Frequently, we deal with the impo-
sition of some foreign perspective on an idea, a perspective that does 
not have to be “present.” This often happens in relation to Greek philoso-
phy, when concepts proper to Christian reflection are imposed on the for-
mer, which is then analyzed from the perspective of Christianity. This 
concerns both ontology and political philosophy. It is difficult to talk 
about presentism here (though certain presentistic goals often seem 
to be behind this). For this reason, I propose using the concept of “non-
contextualism” in place of “presentism,” where presentism would be 
a special case of the former. 
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A question arises here: what should the application of non-contex-
tualism to the initial findings of contextualism consist in? How should 
non-contextualism be understood? Let us start with the second issue. 
I understand non-contextualism as the path to extracting, grasping, 
and understanding the timeless, universal object of knowledge that 
is hidden beneath a contextual formula. There can be no doubt that 
in political philosophy, non-contextualism understood this way is based 
on the assumption, probably unverifiable, that humanity as such, 
human nature in itself remains unchanging, independent of the broadly-
understood environmental context (both natural and cultural), in which 
and through which it expresses itself. Two doubts arise here. First, 
does nature so understood really exist? Second, even if it is real, is it 
worth searching for, keeping in mind that we will be perpetually con-
demned to moving around in the sphere of assumptions and hypotheses? 
I think that the answer to the second question stems from the answer 
to the first one. That is why we will begin with the second question. 
From a historical perspective, political philosophy addresses 
key issues for human life: the understanding of humanity, the role 
of the state and political rule, the relationship between justice 
and legal systems, the sense of the functioning of human communi-
ties (of course, in every age these problems gain detailed specific ques-
tions and answers). It would be difficult to find more weighty and fun-
damental problems. If would be unthinkable for us to leave the results 
of thousands of years of human reflection on the side, when we can 
see that in many areas different from political philosophy (e.g., ontol-
ogy, epistemology, logic, musical theory, etc.), this reflection has left us 
with many timeless discoveries and with findings that are still signifi-
cant for us today. I think that only someone ignorant could assert that 
since so many years have gone by since the time of, for example, Aristo-
tle, his philosophy must necessarily not be of value to us. In a nutshell: 
works in the history of political philosophy deal with problems of such 
a caliber for understanding the way man and human communities func-
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tion that it would be foolish to forget about them. What does this add 
to our reflections on the problem of the timelessness of human nature? 
The fact that if we desire not only to grasp and understand the con-
ceptions formulated in past ages in their context, but also to make 
an attempt at using the wisdom they hold, it is necessary to indicate 
a plane that would serve as a mediator between ideas. This is precisely 
what the hypothesis of a timeless human nature serves to do. Let me 
repeat: it is a hypothesis, or better yet—an axiom, that is the necessary 
condition for transferring ideas in the history of political philosophy. 
Let us move to the question of applying non-contextualism 
to the grasped, almost always only fragmentarily, context. As I men-
tioned when defining political philosophy, I consider its object to be prob-
lems concerning the causes of the genesis of the state and the under-
standing of the state, the relationship between the political and human 
nature, the understanding of and role of justice (especially in refer-
ence to the legal system), and the relationship between the individ-
ual and the state. I take the indicated issues to be precisely that non-
contextual object. They are questions, which thinkers concentrated 
on political matters have posed since the beginnings of human reflec-
tion. This is a hypothesis, in truth, but strongly grounded in the history 
of political ideas. 
The task of political philosophy, then, is, first of all, to extract 
and grasp precisely these questions and the proposed answers 
in the history of reflection on politics. Sometimes this task is relatively 
simple, since there were many authors in the history of political phi-
losophy who wrote about these problems explicitly. Sometimes, however, 
the achievement of the indicated goal will require a lot of work, as it will 
be necessary to generalize on the basis of more specific statements that 
do not directly refer to general problems. Nonetheless, without extract-
ing the essential problems we cannot speak of political philosophy. 
After extracting the indicated problems, it is necessary to return 
to the context. For a proper understanding of the non-contextual mes-
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sage, it is vital to place them within their proper context as faithfully 
as possible. Otherwise, we will inevitably impose on the concepts, value 
systems, etc., meanings taken from other ages, most often—from our 
own. It is only after this second contextualization that we approach 
the non-contextual meaning of historically-grounded political ideas. 
Let us add that political philosophy did not develop, and will proba-
bly (sic!) never develop a language as universal and formal as math-
ematics or music (notes). If we had something similar at our disposal, 
we could possibly dream about a fully non-contextual discourse within 
the bounds of this discipline. However, since we do not have such a lan-
guage, the road leading beyond the context must be taken cautiously, 
conscientiously, and, what is very significant, in a way that is open 
to discussion. The greatest hurdle here to creative and fruitful dis-
cussion will probably be all petrifaction and dogmatization. As I men-
tioned above, the non-contextual reading of political philosophy very 
rarely leads to unambiguous and certain findings. More often, we end 
up with many hypotheses, which we can at most discuss in terms 
of probability, not certainty. Such a situation means that open and crit-
ical discussion is required as an absolutely necessary instrument, 
in which even the questions asked should be investigated and studied, 
not to mention the proposed answers. 
To illustrate the above remarks, I will allow myself to cite a few 
examples. Of course, this is a somewhat delicate matter, since I will 
have to refer to certain works in secondary literature. I do not do so, 
however, from the perspective of one wishing to instruct or admonish, 
but from the perspective of a skeptic-zetetic. 
Let us begin with a classical problem. The Aristotelian concept 
of zoon politikon and related idea of a “slave by nature”5 (let us add 
that we can find this same problem in the so-called pseudopythagorean 
works6). This is one of the most controversial issues in the Stagirite’s 
5 Aristotle, Politica, edited by W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), 1252a.
6 In a text atributed to Zaleukos of Lokroi one finds the following observation: “Slaves should 
do what is just through fear, but free men, through shame, and for the sake of beauty in conduct.” 
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political philosophy. Much has been written on this subject, in general 
emphasizing the socio-economic conditions that Aristotle, in the com-
mentator’s opinion, was unable to transcend.7 For, the functioning 
of slavery as an institution that did not meet with social reservations, 
as an institution resulting from “natural” conditions, in an automatic 
and uncritical way was to be incorporated by this thinker into his con-
ception of political rule. However, the question arises if we are not try-
ing to explain away and interpret this problematic subject too eas-
ily. Are we not trying, from the perspective of an age in which slavery 
is the symbol of socio-politico-economic savagery and clear injustice, 
to sweep the shameful acceptance, even apology of slavery in the phi-
losophy of a famous and acknowledged authority “under the carpet” 
by ascribing to him entanglement in the historical context which was 
impossible to go beyond? Let us look at this issue from a slightly differ-
ent perspective, indicating different interpretive possibilities. 
It is doubtless that the universally indicated politico-economic 
context plays an important role in the concept of “slavery by nature.” 
The thing is that “slavery by nature” does not match up with the social 
institution: not every slave is a “slave by nature,” and not every free 
man is truly free. The fundamental criterion distinguishing a “slave 
by nature” from one who is “free” is that ability to independently aspire 
to the good. The consequence of this distinction is the variety of ways 
of ruling: the most effective method for “slaves by nature” is fear, while 
for those “free by nature”—shame.8 Let us put forth a hypothesis: 
the concept of “slave by nature” was, of course, formulated in a specific 
See: H. Thesleff, The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period (Åbo: Åbo Akademi, 1965), p. 228. 
The text is also available online: Hellenismo. The True Roots of Europe, September 28, 2012, 
“Political Fragments: Ancient Examples of True Righteousness” <https://hellenismo.wordpress.
com/2012/09/28/political-fragments-ancient-examples-of-true-righteousness> (01.04.2015).
7 So states Giovanni Reale, writing, among others, that: “Aristotle, on the other hand, 
wants to defend at any cost his own view that slavery is a ‘state of nature.’ […] in this matter 
the philosopher followed the prejudices and convictions of his time so far as to artifically bend 
his own principles so that they fit those convictions.” G. Reale, Historia filozofii starożytnej. T. II. 
Platon i Arystoteles, trans. E. I. Zieliński (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 1996), p. 511.
8 In the text ascribed to Zaleucus of Locri, we read: “[S]laves should act justly out of fear, 
but free men out of shame and beauty.” See: H. Thesleff, The Pythagorean Texts…, p. 228.
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politico-economic context, but at the same it goes beyond this context, 
introducing a clear ethico-political correction to it. The correction may 
be considered timeless, especially when juxtaposed with the proposi-
tions of Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes (in which fear is consid-
ered the most effective, or only, instrument of political rule). Therefore, 
it seems that in accepting a solely contextual position, we lose not just 
an insignificant deal, but the essence of the problem. 
We are dealing with a similar situation in regards to the reflec-
tion of Thomas Hobbes. Countless authors indicate the key signifi-
cance of the historical context for Hobbes’ concept of the state of nature 
and his version of the social contract, especially the civil war and revo-
lution in England. Without a doubt, these events played an important 
role in forming the views of the English philosopher. But what follows 
from stating this fact? Is this meant to be a “justification”? Is it to be 
understood in the way that, had Hobbes lived at a different time, in dif-
ferent socio-political conditions, the conceptions he would have created 
would be different from the ones we know, for example, from the Levia-
than? This is very probable, but at the same time unimportant and ines-
sential. What is important and essential is what Hobbes did write. 
Especially since these were, it seems, the intentions of the thinker 
himself: to formulate a conception of the genesis and essence of politi-
cal rule, based on a new conception of human nature. The fact that 
the observations he made during the bloody events in his homeland 
allowed him to more precisely and more clearly show certain issues 
does not mean that the most important consequences of his writings 
do not go far beyond the context which accompanied their creation. 
A different sort of problem arises when we disregard a precise investi-
gation of the broadly-understood context. One of the clearest cases of this 
concerns the political aspects of sophist reflection (especially the philoso-
phy of Protagoras and Gorgias). The interpretation that dominates in sec-
ondary literature indicates simple subjectivism (sometimes relativism, 
or relativism and subjectivism) as the foundation of sophism, and in ref-
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erence to political matters individualism, the social contract, and democ-
ratism (often with a clear modern ideological spin, showing the soph-
ists, especially the first generation, as ancient “liberals”) are accented. 
The issue is unusually complicated, intricate, and multi-aspected.
The point of departure must be a detailed linguistic analysis 
of the source texts. A seemingly trite and obvious postulate, though 
looking at the secondary literature (I have in mind literature in the field 
of political thought and political philosophy, not philology or the history 
of ancient philosophy), this postulate seems very timely. Both texts con-
taining Protagoras’ ideas, and those containing the conceptions of Gor-
gias are, from a linguistic point of view, ambiguous. It is therefore nec-
essary to take into account various translational possibilities when 
conducting analyses. 
It is necessary, then, to analyze the ontological and epistemologi-
cal context both of the principle of anthropos metron (homo mensura)9, 
and that of the treatise Peri tou me ontos e peri physeos10. This analy-
sis must, at the same time, take into account the philosophical con-
text in which Protagoras and Gorgias appeared, which is constituted 
by pre-Socratic philosophy, especially that of the Eleatic School. Moreo-
ver, the question of, for example, the ontological or epistemological char-
acter of the theses contained in the homo mensura principle is open 
to debate, as there are researchers who question such a formulation 
because they consider the Platonic analyses contained in the Theaetetus 
speculations which go beyond the intentions of the thinker from Abdera. 
Therefore, in researching the ontologico-epistemological context, one 
must retain the proper distance from the thesis that this aspect is at all 
9 Plato, “Theaetetus,” in: Platonis Opera. Recensuit J. Burnet (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1903), 166a–168c.
10 Gorgias B 3, Following the convention adopted in this issue of Folia Philosophica, 
all references to the works of the presocratic philosophers are made to the texts included 
in the following edition: Hermann Diels, Walther Kranz, eds., Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 
(Vols. 1–3), trans. Hermann Diels (Dublin, Zürich: Weidmann, 1964–1966). The format 
of the reference will henceforth include the following elements: an abbreviated name of the author 
(e.g. “Xenoph.” for Xenophanes of Colophon), the capitalized letter denoting the section of the Diels–
Kranz collection (“A” or “B”), the sequential number of the fragment and the number denoting 
the verse, e.g. (Xenoph. B 34, 4).
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present in the thought of Protagoras, and, in consequence, maintain 
awareness that we are constantly moving around amongst hypotheses, 
where it is impossible to gain certainty, only some degree of probability. 
The next step is a politico-legal analysis of the context, in which 
we need to be aware of the meaning, role, and principles of rhetoric, 
with a special emphasis on court rhetoric. 
It is only an analysis of all of the indicated aspects (in the midst 
of which other areas of investigation will surely appear) that will allow 
for the building of a solid foundation for the search for non-contextual 
themes in sophist reflection. Without putting forth this effort we are 
condemned to trite, stereotypical, and clearly ideologically “set” ideas 
about sophist thought. It is enough to show that the role of sophistry 
cannot be overestimated in Platonic reflection to attest to the particular 
significance of sophistry in the history of philosophy and political philos-
ophy. Personally, I feel that for political philosophy, the debate between 
Plato and the sophists is one of the most significant and most fundamen-
tal, if not the most significant and most fundamental, discussions con-
cerning the meaning and understanding of the political and the under-
standing and role of justice in politico-legal systems. 
A wonderful example of imposing one’s own ideas on the inter-
pretation of ancient political philosophy are the works of Eric Voege-
lin. I conducted a more detailed analysis of Voegelin’s interpretation 
of Platonic philosophy elsewhere.11 Here, I will present only my main 
observations. First, Voegelin creates his own conception of the history 
of political ideas, whose most important thesis is that the responsibil-
ity for the tragedies that touched 20th century politics and the political 
philosophy at its basis falls on the “immanent hypostasis of the escha-
ton.” Then, Voegelin searches for a justification for his thesis in the his-
tory of political ideas. However, he does this in a manipulative way. 
11 See: P. Świercz, “Plato. Voegelin. Transcendence. Politics. A Few Remarks about 
Transcendent Reception of Non-Transcendent Concept as a Fundament of Political Project,” Littera 
Antiqua, vol. VII, 2013, pp. 52–65. See also: K. Kołakowska, “Voegelin. Rhetoric and Politics 
in Aristotle,” Littera Antiqua, vol. VII, 2013, pp. 43–51.
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Hence, in reference to Plato, he accepts that the creator of the Acad-
emy bases his philosophy and its political consequences on the idea 
of transcendence. He does not justify this in any way and does not con-
sider other possibilities. Simply: epekeina meant transcendence for Plato. 
Such an interpretation is certainly admissable. But when the whole 
reading of Plato is grounded on that thought, it must be analyzed thor-
oughly and critically. But Voegelin seems only to want a justification 
for his proposition on how to understand the history of ideas. What 
Plato really thought is not of interest to him. The apparent contextu-
alism here is only a means meant to serve a non-contextual project, 
not the point of departure to seek what is timeless. This is clear dogma-
tism, which, dressing itself up as philosophy, is in essence very far away 
from it, as every ideology is far from the skeptic-zetetico-critical position. 
Let us summarize. Criticism in the history of political philosophy 
can be summarized in a few fundamental postulates. First, it is neces-
sary to grasp the context in the fullest possible way. Above all, a very 
precise linguistic analysis is needed, in which different possible trans-
lations and interpretations are taken into account. A lack of this, espe-
cially in regards to ancient texts, is very often the main cause of mis-
taken understandings, or even manipulative interpretations. 
It is essential to place the political reflection of the given author 
within his ontologico-epistemological analyses, or, at the very least, 
to juxtapose the two. I am not saying that a systematic approach should 
be taken. But, on the other hand, it is difficult to move on when these 
two elements are incompatible. Since ontology and epistemology are, 
each in its own aspect, the most general formulations of everything, then 
this also refers to political matter. 
Due to its object, the history of political philosophy also requires 
that the broad political, legal, social, and economic context in which 
the text was written be taken into account. In general, it is also neces-
sary to take into account the cultural context (I have in mind literature, 
music, art, religion, and customs). 
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It is only on a foundation so-prepared that non-contextual research 
should be introduced. Let me repeat once more: with work on the context, 
it is very easy to ascribe views to past authors that they would never 
have accepted. A position such as that is closer to ideology than to phi-
losophy. At the same time, limiting ourselves to contextual interpreta-
tions makes the effort of many generations of philosophers and political 
philosophers de facto dead and unnecessary; at best—something akin 
to a museum exhibit.
In other words, I only see sense in studying the history of political 
philosophy if one keeps in mind the “philosophizing history of political 
philosophy.”12 Otherwise, we become either “custodians,” or ignorant ide-
ologues. And though its difficult not to agree that the former is a nobler 
pastime than the latter, it seems that in a certain sense, the former 
gives birth to the latter. People will always seek so-called “eternal 
and unchanging” problems. But leaving the discussion about those 
problems in the hands of the incompetent, or even charlatans, is, to 
a large measure, the consequence of the neglect on the part of those, 
who decided to remain nothing more than “custodians” of the history 
of political philosophy.
12 The first person whom I heard use a similar phrase, and who directed me toward the search 
for the method in the history of political philosophy, was my long-time superior at the Department 
of Political Thought of the University of Silesia in Katowice, professor Wojciech Kaute (he would 
use the expression: “the philosophizing history of political ideas”). A similar conception was 
presented by Prof. Jan Baszkiewicz at the beginning of the present century. See: J. Baszkiewicz, 
“Zagajenie konferencji,” in: Doktryny polityczne i prawne u progu XXI wieku. Wybrane problemy 
badawcze, M. Maciejewski, M. Marszał, eds. (Wrocław: Kolonia Limited, 2002), p. 10–14. 
See especially p. 12, where we can find the phrase: “the philosophizing history of political thought.”
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Kontekstualism wobec niekontekstualizmu  
w świetle filozofii politycznej  
Przyczynek do debaty poświęconej krytycyzmowi 
w naukach politycznych
Streszczenie: Autor stawia sobie za cel dokonanie analizy zagadnienia krytycyzmu 
w kontekście nauk politycznych, a ściślej – w przestrzeni filozofii politycznej. Problem 
ten rozważany jest w świetle dwóch podstawowych stanowisk epistemologicznych: 
kontekstualizmu i prezentyzmu. Te dwie metody rozumiane są zazwyczaj jako wza-
jemnie się wykluczające, jednak celem autora jest przedstawienie argumentów wska-
zujących ich łączliwość i wykazanie, iż potraktowanie ich jako komplementarnych jest 
koniecznym punktem wyjścia dla postaw krytycznych w filozofii politycznej.
Słowa kluczowe: filozofia polityczna, nauki polityczne, krytycyzm, historyzm, kon-
tekstualizm, prezentyzm.
